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 Abstract 
 We examine whether prosperous economic times have both immediate and lasting 
implications for corporate misconduct among CEOs. Drawing on research suggesting that prosperous 
times are associated with excessive risk-taking, overconfidence, and more opportunities to cheat, we 
first propose that CEOs will be more likely to engage in corporate misconduct during good economic 
times. Next, we propose that CEOs who begin their careers in prosperous times will be more likely to 
engage in self-serving corporate misconduct later in their careers. We tested these hypotheses by 
assembling a large dataset of American CEOs and following their stock option reporting patterns 
between 1996 and 2005. We found that in good economic times, CEOs were more likely to backdate 
their stock options grants. Moreover, CEOs who began their careers in prosperous times were more 
likely to backdate stock option grants later in their careers. These findings suggest that the state of the 
economy can influence current ethical behavior and leave a lasting imprint on the moral proclivities of 
new workforce entrants.  
 
 
Keywords: ethics, CEO misconduct, backdating, macroeconomy, recessions   
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“Never before have so many unskilled twenty-four-year-olds made so much money  
in so little time as we did this decade in New York and London. There has never before been 
such a fantastic exception to the rule of the marketplace that one takes out no more than one 
puts in.” 
      -Michael Lewis (1989), Liar’s Poker 
 
 
When Michael Lewis and his cohort entered Wall Street in the mid-1980s, signs of American 
prosperity were seemingly everywhere. Extravagant demonstrations of wealth were visible and 
common, from expensive new china in the White House to glamourous birthday parties for celebrity 
CEOs (Mills, 1991). Madonna’s “Material Girl” cracked the Billboard Top 5 and Wall Street titans 
such as Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken became public celebrities who earned outsized salaries and 
spent lavishly. Like many prosperous periods, the 1980s were also plagued by ethical scandals (e.g., 
Galbraith, 1954; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). By the end of the decade, 
over half the Savings and Loans Banks had failed and over 1,000 executives, many from well-known 
banks, faced federal indictments (Eisenger, 2014). Five United States senators became entangled in a 
corruption scandal and both Boesky and Milken were imprisoned for securities fraud.   
In this paper, we examine whether such prosperous times have both immediate and lasting 
implications for corporate misconduct among CEOs. Drawing on work showing that prosperous times 
are associated with risk-taking, overconfidence, greater opportunities to cheat and lax oversight, we 
argue that CEOs will be more likely to cheat in prosperous relative to lean economic times. We also 
argue that economic conditions at the beginning of a CEO’s career will affect the likelihood of 
engaging in ethically-suspect practices later on. Specifically, we propose that CEOs who enter the 
workforce during prosperous times will be more likely to use unethical means for personal gain later 
in their careers than CEOs who begin their careers in leaner economic times. Like other scholars, we 
define corporate misconduct as behavior that is illegal, violates collectively agreed upon norms, or 
directly harms employees or shareholders (e.g., Jones, 1991; Gino & Pierce, 2009).   
Economic Conditions and Unethical Behavior 
At first glance, it seems likely that recessions might engender rather than temper corporate 
misconduct. During recessions, resources shrink and needs swell. When resources are scarce, 
engaging in unethical behavior may be more economically valuable and materially tempting. 
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Consistent with this reasoning, recent work has shown that financial deprivation can loosen moral 
standards and increase the likelihood of engaging in immoral conduct (Sharma et al, 2014). Similarly, 
other work suggests that when organizations are under strain, corporate leaders are driven to alleviate 
this pressure through any means necessary, including engaging in illegal behavior (Staw and 
Szwajkowski, 1975; Finney and Lesieur, 1982; Vaughn, 1999). Reasoning from prospect theory also 
appears to suggest that recessions might cultivate misconduct. During downturns, corporate leaders 
are more likely to face losses and may take excessive risks to recover these deficits (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). If such risks include pushing ethical boundaries, then 
unethical behavior may thrive when the economy flounders.  
In this paper, we make the opposite prediction, namely that workplace misconduct among 
CEOs will shrink during downturns and swell during booms. We base this prediction on several lines 
of reasoning. The first is opportunity. During booms, credit is more accessible and capital is plentiful, 
making it easier to attract investors and fund ethically dubious ventures (Noe and Robello, 1994; 
Ruckes, 2004; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; Akerloff and Shiller, 2009). In addition, as financial 
bubbles swell and profits flourish, new investors often flood financial markets. These new investors 
tend to be less sophisticated, making it easier for swindlers to prosper and suspect practices to go 
undetected (Lux, 1995; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; Akerloff and Shiller, 2009).  Moreover, 
outsiders tend to be less vigilant detectives of unethical behavior during booms (Povel, Singh, & 
Winton, 2007; Philippon, 2006). When people are making money, they are less likely to question 
suspicious practices and police greedy executives. Indeed, people are more likely to cheat a little bit 
when they believe their transgressions will avert detection (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Mazar, Amir, 
& Ariely, 2008) and they seem to be more likely avert detection when things are going well. 
Consequently, scholars have suggested that managers and firms are more incentivized to commit 
fraud during booms, in part because the payoffs of fraud are particularly high at the same time that 
monitoring is relatively low (Povel, Singh, & Winton, 2007). Thus, the opportunity to engage in 
ethically suspect practices is likely to be higher in good economic times.  
In addition to opportunity, prosperous times are also likely to engender ethical missteps 
through psychological mechanisms such as overconfidence and increased comfort with risk (Coates 
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and Herbert, 2008; Galbraith, 1954; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Shiller, 2005). During booms, 
investments are more likely to yield positive returns and risk-taking tends to become increasingly 
extreme. For instance, one study of London stock traders showed that when the market was rising, 
testosterone increased, risk appetites swelled, and traders made increasingly larger bets (Coates and 
Herbert, 2008). Another study found that when financial professionals were primed with signals of 
prosperity, they took greater risks (Cohn et al, 2015). Indeed, booms have been described as periods 
of “irrational exuberance” (Greenspan, 1996), “mania” (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) and 
“speculative make-believe” (Galbraith, 1954), all of which reflect unbridled optimism and a greater 
penchant for risk-taking.  
This mentality can direct attention towards possible rewards from unethical behavior and 
away from potential negative consequences (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Gino and Margolis, 2011; 
Coates, 2012). For instance, one study found that overconfident executives were more likely to 
commit reporting fraud in part because they were over-optimistic about future returns (Schrand and 
Zechman, 2012). When the gains did not materialize they were more likely to fudge accounting 
figures to cover these blunders. Moreover, overconfidence and its accompanying aura of invincibility 
may lead people to underestimate the likelihood that their misdeeds will be detected (Gino and 
Margolis, 2011). Indeed, firms are more likely to commit fraud when they exceed earnings aspirations 
and expectations, in part because success provokes a sense of invincibility (Mishina, Dykes, Block, 
and Pollock, 2010).  
On the surface, these findings appear at odds with the predictions from prospect theory noted 
earlier. While prospect theory seems to predict that executives may be particularly risk seeking during 
busts to recoup losses, empirical examinations show that risk-seeking actually rises during booms 
(Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001; Acharya & Naqvi, 2012; Cohn et al., 2015). For instance, many 
scholars have attributed the recent subprime mortgage crisis to excessive risk taking among financial 
firms (Shiller, 2012). Other recent work has shown that when financial professionals are primed to 
think about prosperous times, they select riskier investments (Cohn, et al, 2015). One way to reconcile 
these findings with prospect theory is through aspirations and expectations (Harris and Bromley, 
2007; Greve, Palmer, and Pozner, 2010). Leaders and organizations tend to assess their outcomes 
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against the performance of salient others as well against their own past performance (Cyert & March, 
1963; Harris and Bromiley, 2007). When a firm exceeds its past performance or when other salient 
firms are doing well, aspirations and expectations soar (Greve, Palmer, and Pozner, 2010; Harris and 
Bromiley, 2007; Mishina, Dykes, Block, and Pollock, 2010). In good times, firms are both more 
likely to exceed past performance and watch comparisons firms excel. As a result, expectations and 
aspirations will likely swell and corporate leaders may be willing to do whatever it takes to meet 
rising expectations (Greve, Palmer, and Pozner, 2010; Mishina, Dykes, Block, and Pollock, 2010). 
Indeed, similar logic has been used to account for why CEOs are more likely to engage in misconduct 
when their firms are doing particularly well (Mishina, Dykes, Block, and Pollock, 2010), why 
investors are more risk seeking in good economic times (e.g. Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001; 
Cohn et al., 2015), and why signals of abundance increase the prevalence of cheating (Gino and 
Pierce, 2009).  
Consistent with the idea that booms cultivate overconfidence, risk taking, and ethical 
missteps, economic booms are often associated with major corporate ethics scandals (Galbraith, 1954; 
Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Povel, Singh, and Winton, 2007). The boom of the 1980s was 
followed by the Savings and Loans Scandal and the widespread indictment of bank executives. The 
internet bubble of the late 1990s was followed by revelations of financial improprieties and fraudulent 
accounting at major corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco (Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2005; Povel, Singh, and Winton, 2007; Akerloff and Shiller, 2009). Each economic boom has a cast 
of corporate villains, from Ivan Boesky and Michael Milliken in the boom of the 1980s to Dennis 
Kozlowski and Kenneth Lay in the economic surge of the late 1990s and Dick Fuld and Bernie 
Madoff in the early 2000s.  
While booms have been described as periods of overconfidence, excessive optimism, and an 
increased appetite for risk, recessions are characterized by uncertainty, caution, and fear (Galbraith, 
1954; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Akerloff and Shiller, 2009; Bianchi, 2016). When resources are 
scarce and the economy is floundering, people hold others to higher moral standards and are more 
vigilant detectives of immoral behavior, in part because of increased vulnerability to unethical acts 
(Povel, Singh, and Winton, 2007; Pitesa and Thau, 2014). In addition, oversight and regulation tend to 
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flourish during downturns in part to mitigate uncertainty and vulnerability (Galbraith, 1954; 
Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Shiller, 2005). Indeed, as Galbraith (1954) wrote, “[during recessions] 
money is watched with a narrow, suspicious eye…Audits are penetrating and meticulous. Commercial 
morality is enormously improved” (p. 134). In sum, during challenging economic times, people are 
both more fearful, risk-averse, and wary of fraud-minded others (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; 
Povel, Singh, and Winton, 2007). As such, we predicted that during such times, corporate leaders 
would be less likely to engage in corporate misconduct.  
Hypothesis 1: CEOs will be less likely to utilize unethical business practices during bad 
economic times and more likely to utilize such practices during good economic times. 
The Imprint of Early Work Experiences  
Our second prediction is that entering the workforce during an economic boom will have 
lasting implications for how likely new workers are to engage in corporate misconduct later in their 
careers. Early career experiences can leave an enduring mark on the mental models and approaches to 
work that executives carry with them throughout their adult lives (Higgins, 2005; Malmendier and 
Nagel, 2011; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011; Schoar and Zuo, 2012; Bianchi, 2013; Marquis and 
Tilcsik, 2013; Bianchi, 2014). Early in their careers, people are particularly sensitive to the socializing 
influences of their surroundings and tend to develop routines, norms, and practices that are adaptive to 
these early career environments (Higgins, 2005; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013). 
Economic conditions during this sensitive period can leave a particularly strong mark on the 
behavior and management styles of CEOs (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011; Schoar and Zuo, 2012). 
For instance, CEOs who start their working lives in economic booms tend to favor riskier financial 
strategies, such as greater leveraging, higher overhead costs, or minimal diversification (Malmendier, 
Tate, and Yan, 2011; Scholar and Zuo, 2012). Those who come of age in downturns, however, tend to 
be more deliberate and risk averse, reflecting the more cautious mood of their early working lives. 
Moreover, CEOs who begin their careers amidst economic prosperity tend to exhibit greater 
narcissism later on, presumably reflecting the greater individualism and excessive confidence of the 
period in which they came of age (Bianchi, 2014).  
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Building on this work, we expected that CEOs who began their working lives during an 
economic boom would be more likely to adopt an ethically lax approach to work. These new workers 
have few existing templates for how work is done, which rules are followed, and which shortcuts are 
customary. Thus, they are particularly apt to look to others to determine whether it is acceptable to 
double bill a client or inflate an expense report. Indeed, past work has shown that new workers are 
particularly likely to be become acclimated to morally questionable business practices often without 
explicitly recognizing the ethical implications of their behavior (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). 
Moreover, as novices trying to ascend the organizational hierarchy, new workers are likely to feel 
particularly strong pressure to adopt existing norms, even if they do recognize the immorality of a 
practice. For instance, one workplace ethics survey found that employees who were early in their 
careers and relatively new to their organizations were twice as likely to feel pressure to compromise 
their ethical standards compared to older, more tenured adults (Ethics Resource Center, 2003).  
For CEOs who begin their careers in prosperous times, taking shortcuts and pushing ethical 
boundaries may become the template for how things are done and what it takes to succeed and 
survive. Unethical behavior is a domain in which people are particularly apt to look to others when 
assessing what is normative and acceptable (Cialdini, 1984; Cialdini and Trost, 1998; Moore and 
Gino, 2013). For instance, people are more likely to cheat on their tax returns when they believe 
others are cheating (Wenzel, 2005) and more likely to litter when they see another person litter first 
(Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren, 1990). Once established, these routines often become habits that endure 
across time and organizations (Higgins, 2005). Thus, we expect that CEOs who enter the workforce in 
prosperous times will be more likely to employ unethical tactics when the opportunity arises.  
Hypothesis 2: CEOs who begin their careers in prosperous times will be more likely to utilize 
unethical business practices than CEOs who begin their careers in more lean economic times.  
These hypotheses seek to make two primary contributions to scholarship on misconduct 
among corporate elites. First, while past research has considered contextual antecedents of CEO 
misconduct, much of this work has focused on proximal variables within the organization. For 
instance, studies have found that CEOs are more likely to manipulate earnings (Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006) or commit securities fraud (Denis, Hanouna, and Sarin, 2006) if their compensation 
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is strongly tied to company performance. Other work has linked corporate misconduct to governance 
practices, such as the number of outside representatives on the board (e.g., Beasley, 1996). We seek to 
build on this work by considering whether strong situational forces outside the organization can 
similarly influence the likelihood of cheating. In doing so, this work highlights the role of broader 
macro-environmental events in shaping the moral behavior of CEOs.  
Our inquiry also suggests that strong experiences at a formative stage of life can have lasting 
implications for ethical behavior later on. While organizational scholars have documented the costs 
and consequences of corporate misconduct (e.g., Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2008; Pfarrer, Decelles, 
Smith, and Taylor, 2008), relatively little is known about which CEOs are more likely to cheat. Past 
work has looked to relatively stable traits such as narcissism (Blickle, Schlegel, Fassbender, and 
Klein, 2006; Watts et al., 2013) or intelligence (Subrahmanyam, 2005) to predict which CEOs are 
more likely to engage in misconduct. The present work explores whether experiences at a formative 
stage of life can have lasting implications for how likely a CEO is to cheat at work later on.  
METHODS 
We tested our hypotheses by constructing a large dataset of CEOs who ran publically traded 
companies in the United States between 1996 and 2005. For each CEO, we tracked his stock option 
reporting patterns over a ten year period. We gauged corporate misconduct by examining the 
likelihood that each stock option grant awarded during this time was backdated. Backdating stock 
option grants was a fairly common and unscrupulous practice in the late 1990s and early 2000s (e.g., 
Lie, 2005; Carow, Heron, Lie and Neal, 2009). In a typical backdating event, a CEO would receive a 
stock option grant on one date but report that these options were assigned at an earlier date when the 
stock price was lower. This enabled him to realize greater gains than if he accurately reported the date 
of the award. For instance, a CEO who was issued stock options on a day when his company’s stock 
price was $100 could report that he actually received the options one week earlier when the stock 
price was $80. In doing so, he would receive an additional $20 per share gain when he exercised the 
options and sold the stock.  
In the late 1990s, executives were required to report option awards to the SEC within one 
month and one week of the date the options were issued. This allowed considerable flexibility in 
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reporting the award date. This means that if the stock price on the day of the grant award was higher 
than the price in preceding or subsequent days, a CEO could simply report that the grant was awarded 
on a more favorable date (Lie, 2005). We focused on CEOs because data for these executives is 
relatively complete and accessible due to disclosure requirements. Moreover, reporting the date of a 
grant assignment to the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) is often governed within the 
executive suite. Consequently, CEOs have more control over whether their stock options are 
backdated compared to other executives or directors (Wiersema and Zhang, 2013). 
Backdating is typically illegal as well as highly unethical (Narayanan, Schipani, and Seyhun, 
2007; Carow, Heron, Lie and Neal, 2009; Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010; Wiersema and Zhang, 
2013).1 It requires lying about the date a grant was received and necessitates intentionally falsifying 
financial documents that are submitted to the SEC (e.g., Lie, 2005). Moreover, the additional gains 
received by a backdating executive come at the cost of company profits and shareholder returns 
(Narayanan, Schipani, and Seyhun, 2007). Following public exposure of backdating, many companies 
were forced to restate earnings reports and pay considerable fines. Many individual executives were 
forced to surrender ill-gotten gains, pay substantial civil penalties, and even relinquish their jobs 
(Wiersema and Zhang, 2013).   
This practice began receiving considerable public attention following the publication of a 
Wall Street Journal front page story in March, 2006 (Forelle and Bandler, 2006), which chronicled 
the suspiciously fortuitous timing of stock awards at six large companies. In one company, a CEO 
received six separate stock option grants shortly before a sharp rise in the stock price. The estimated 
odds of this happening simply by luck were one in 300 billion. Academic research also confirmed that 
executives received stock options on favorable dates far more often than chance alone would predict 
(Heron and Lie, 2007; Lie, 2005; Yermack, 1997; Narayanan and Seyhun, 2008). One paper estimated 
that 29% of publically traded companies were engaged in backdating at some point (Heron and Lie, 
                                                            
1
 Backdating stock options can be legal if the following conditions are met: 1) the firm counts the additional 
gains received by backdating as a compensation expense and 2) the firm discloses this practice to the SEC and 
to shareholders in a timely manner (Wiersema and Zhang, 2013). However, if individuals or firms fulfill these 
requirements, there are no benefits from backdating. If properly reported, the additional income would be 
treated as taxable compensation for the individual and firms could record the additional gains as expenses 
reducing their tax liabilities. Consequently, very few people legally reported reissuing stock dates.  
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2009).  Following regulatory changes, the rate of unusually lucky award dates dropped considerably 
(Heron and Lie, 2009). This suggests that executives were not simply talented predictors of future 
stock gains. Rather, many were manipulating the date of their awards to realize greater profits (Heron 
and Lie, 2009).  
Backdating provides several advantages for testing our hypotheses compared to other 
commonly used metrics of corporate misconduct such as earnings restatements or shareholder 
lawsuits. The first is detection. Only some cases of executive misconduct are actually detected and it 
is unclear whether such cases are representative of overall misconduct. Earnings restatements and 
shareholder lawsuits both rely on either detection or admission of misconduct. Backdating does not. 
As such, it is likely to capture a more comprehensive and representative sample of unethical behavior 
among CEOs.  
A second advantage of backdating is that it can be linked directly to the CEO. CEOs have 
considerable control over whether their stock options are backdated (Lie, 2005; Bebchuk, Grinstein, 
and Peyer, 2010; Wiersema and Zhang, 2013). Other commonly used metrics of corporate 
misconduct, such as earnings restatements or shareholder lawsuits, can result from fraud or negligence 
by other members of the organization (Srinivasan, 2005). Indeed, one analysis found that CFOs not 
CEOs were most likely to be terminated following a major earnings restatement (Hennes, Leone, and 
Miller, 2008). Given that our second hypothesis focused on how individual career experiences 
influence later ethical behavior, we wanted to ensure that such behaviors were clearly under the 
CEO’s control. 
Sample 
We began by identifying 2,139 Chief Executive Officers of publically traded companies in 
the United States between 1996 and 2005 who received stock options from their company and were 
also covered in the BoardEx dataset.2 This initial sample was drawn from Thomson Reuters Insider 
Filings database and executives were matched by name to BoardEx. Thomson Reuters includes 
detailed reports from Table 2 of Form 144 submitted to the SEC indicating the date, price, and 
                                                            
2
 1996 was the first year Thomson Reuters collected reliable data on stock option grants. After the exposure of 
the practice, the rate of suspiciously lucky grants dropped to nearly zero (Heron and Lie, 2009).  
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number of options assigned to executives in each firm. This information enabled us to reliably 
estimate whether a stock option grant was likely backdated. BoardEx provides educational history for 
each executive, including each university attended, degrees received, and years of graduation. This 
information allowed us to gauge the economic conditions at the time each executive entered the job 
market. This data was supplemented with firm level data for each company from Compustat and stock 
price data collected from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP).  
We first coded whether a CEO received his or her highest degree from a school in the United 
States. We only included CEOs who graduated from schools in the United States in order to have 
comparable workforce entry economic measures across CEOs. We manually verified the location of 
each university in our sample and successfully identified locations for 580 institutions. Of these, 510 
(87.3%) were universities located only in the United States and 39 were universities located outside 
the United States. For the remaining 31 schools, we either found: 1) matching institutions both inside 
and outside the U.S. (for example, there is a “St. John’s University” both in York, United Kingdom 
and in Long Island, New York) or 2) no matching name anywhere.  
We then identified the year each executive earned his or her highest degree. We did not 
include graduating from professional courses because executives are likely to have already been 
employed when enrolled in these programs (e.g., Executive MBA, supplementary professional 
courses etc.). Finally, we restricted our sample to executives who earned their degrees at or before age 
30. Those who earned a degree after age 30 were likely to have had a substantial amount of work 
experience before returning to school and an additional degree at this stage of life is not likely to mark 
a meaningful career beginning (Bianchi, 2013). However, including people who earned their degrees 
after age 30 does not substantially change our results.  
Our final sample consisted of 2,012 CEOs who attained their highest degree from U.S. 
universities, served as CEOs of a publically-traded company between 1996 and 2005, and received 
non-scheduled stock option grants. As shown in Figure 1, CEOs in this sample earned their degrees 
between 1948 and 1997. Most of the CEOs in our sample were born in the 1940s (N = 863) or the 
1950s (N = 675), with the rest being born in the 1920s (N = 21), 1930s (N = 258), 1960s (N = 191) or 
1970s (N = 4). On average, these CEOs received their highest degree at age 23.2 (SD = 2.47), and 
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more than half (58.4%) did not obtain advanced degrees after college.  The vast majority were male 
(97%).  
-----------------------------------  
Insert Figure 1 about here  
-----------------------------------  
 
Backdating. An option grant was considered backdated if it was awarded on an extremely 
lucky date (Lie, 2005; Yermack, 1997). To gauge extreme luck, we first established a benchmark for 
what was likely to be a suspiciously lucky grant (Bizjak, Lemon and Whitbey, 2009; Heron and Lie, 
2007). To do so, we simulated 100,000 randomly assigned “grants.” We calculated the simple mean 
and standard deviation of the return for each grant i over the possible reporting window [ =
(	
∓)
 ,  = [( − ∓)	]. As expected, the simulated grants had an average return 
 = 0, since the average grant i was given at a price that was on average ∓ (Heron and Lie, 
2007; Bizjak, Lemmon and Whitbey, 2009). The variance produced by this procedure was used to 
assess suspiciously well-timed grants. A grant was considered legitimate if it fell within the 95% 
confidence intervals for random grants assigned to the firm. A grant was considered suspiciously 
lucky and tagged as likely backdated if it fell outside the 95% confidence interval of our simulation 
and on the tail representing the lowest rather than the highest price.  
We illustrate this identification strategy in Figure 2 using a grant reported by Gregory Reyes, 
the CEO of Broadcom in 2000. Based on the date these options were reported to the SEC, Reyes 
could have received the stock any time between April 26, 2000 and June 7, 2000. During this time, 
Broadcom’s stock fluctuated substantially, ranging from a high of $182 in late April to a low of $119 
in late May. Our identification strategy computed the mean price of a theoretical, honest grant and 
created a 95% confidence interval for a truly random stock grant. Based on this strategy, grants would 
be tagged as suspiciously lucky if they were received on May 23rd or May 24th, the two days during 
the reporting window in which the stock price was unusually low.  
-----------------------------------  
Insert Figure 2 about here  
-----------------------------------  
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Of course, there are times when executives are simply extremely lucky. Indeed, even if no 
grants were backdated, 2.5% of the grants should be categorized as very lucky simply by chance. 
However, nearly 15% of the grants in our sample were very lucky, a level far higher than chance 
alone would predict. Moreover, while our procedure captured some luck, this should only introduce 
noise to our models rather than drive any observed effects. Such noise should work against finding 
support for our predictions. 
Independent Variables 
Current economic conditions. Current economic conditions were gauged using the seasonally-
adjusted monthly unemployment rate. The unemployment rate has several advantages over other 
measures of economic health. For one, it is more closely tied with perceptions of the economy than 
any other commonly used metric (Bianchi, 2016). Moreover, unlike other metrics such as GDP, stock 
market performance, or median income which tend to go up steadily over time, the unemployment 
rate does not typically show a strong upward or downward trend over long periods of time. This better 
enabled us to examine the effect of economic conditions apart from other time trends. For these 
reasons, the unemployment rate is the metric most commonly used to the capture the effect of 
economic conditions on attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Ruhm, 1995; Tausig & Fenwick, 1999; Ruhm, 
2000; di Tella, MacCulloch, & Oswald, 2001; Wolfers, 2003; Kahn, 2010; Bianchi 2013; Bianchi, 
2016). The unemployment rate during this period ranged from a low of 3.8% in April of 2000 to a 
high of 6.3% in June 2003.   
Workforce entry economic conditions. Consistent with past research, economic conditions at 
workforce entry were measured using the annual unemployment rate in the year each CEO earned his 
or her highest degree (e.g., Oyer, 2008; Kahn, 2010; Bianchi, 2013). As shown in Figure 1, economic 
conditions fluctuated considerably over this period, with the unemployment rate ranging from 2.9% to 
9.7%. 
Control Variables   
CEO level controls. We included several individual level control variables that past research 
has shown affect the likelihood of backdating or misconduct. First, we controlled for age, using 
executive’s year of birth as reported in BoardEx. This is an important control for two reasons. First, 
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past work has shown that a CEO’s age has implications for ethical transgressions as well as risk-
taking and management style (Ruegger and King, 1992; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Troy, Smith, and 
Domino, 2011). Second, the unemployment rate at workforce entry slightly increased during our 
sample period. Thus controlling for age allowed us to examine the unique effect of workforce 
economic conditions separate from monotonous time trends. In subsequent models, we also tested for 
the possibility of non-linear generational effects by using birth decade dummies rather than age.3 
Opportunity. As discussed at the outset, one reason that CEOs may be more likely to cheat 
during booms is opportunity. For backdating, opportunity can be captured using stock volatility. 
When backdating a stock option, potential gains depend on the volatility of the stock within the 
reporting period. If the stock price fluctuates considerably (and some stock volatility is as high as 
50%), then the gains from backdating are greater. If the stock price if fairly stable, then the gains from 
backdating are much less substantial. Thus, we gauged opportunity by capturing volatility in a +/- 30 
day window from the option grant price. 
For our imprinting analyses, we also controlled for the number of grants awarded to each 
executive over our sample period.  
Firm controls. At the firm level we controlled for firm size. Larger firms typically have more 
internal controls and receive greater attention from regulators and the press (e.g. Doyle, Ge, and 
McVay, 2007). Consequently, executives in these firms are less likely to submit fraudulent financial 
                                                            
3
 We did not include CEO compensation, stock ownership, or tenure in our primary analyses because of data 
limitations. Our data on stock option grants came from the EDGAR system which draws from firm filings to the 
SEC. This dataset did not have information on compensation, stock ownership, or tenure. We attempted to 
match our data to compensation data from Execucomp. Because these two datasets have unique individual 
identifiers and use different naming conventions (e.g., PhD vs. Dr.), we employed an algorithm for exact 
matching based on each CEO’s name. We then manually checked the resulting names for each match. We were 
only able to find matches for 699 out of the 2,012 CEOs in our sample (34.7%). We lost observations for two 
reasons. First, while the EDGAR system draws from the entire universe of publically-traded companies, 
Execucomp only covers executives from 3,300 companies. Thus, not all companies in our sample were covered 
in Execucomp. Second, we were unable to find exact name matches for many of the CEOs in our sample. For 
each CEO in our dataset for whom we were able to find a match, we gathered data for Execucomp data 
measuring TDC1 (log), TDC2 (log), options (log), and firm tenure. We added each of these variables to a the 
models shown in Table 2, Model 4 to test Hypothesis 1 and Table 3, Model 4 to test Hypothesis 2. Using this 
substantially reduced sample, we found marginal support for Hypothesis 1 and full support for Hypothesis 2. 
Adding control variables for compensation and tenure to the models shown in Table 2, Model 4, the current 
unemployment rate was marginally predictive of backdating (b = -0.013, SE = 0.009, p = .11). Including the 
control variables shown in Table 3 and adding a control for compensation and tenure, economic conditions at 
workforce entry were predictive of later unethical behavior (b = -0.013, SE = 0.005, p < .01). In both sets of 
analyses, none of the forms of compensation or tenure were significant predictors of backdating. Moreover, 
similar effects emerged in these restricted samples whether or not we controlled for compensation or tenure.   
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documents to the SEC (Bebchuk and Roe 1999; Bebchuk et al. 2010). Several measures are frequently 
used to capture firm size, including revenues, assets, and number of employees. For our analysis we 
used the log revenues of the firm, a common metric of firm size (e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; 
Schrand and Zechman, 2012; Benmelech and Frydman, 2015). We reconducted all analyses using the 
logged number of employees and logged total assets as measures of firm size and similar results 
emerged.   
We also included dummy variables for industry categories using the two digit SIC codes as 
reported in Compustat. Backdating was more prevalent in some industries than in others, and was 
especially prevalent in the technology sector (Heron and Lie, 2007). Moreover, misconduct often 
varies across industries, in part because of differential oversight and regulations across industries 
(Baucus and Near, 1991; Benmelech and Frydman, 2015). In addition, we used a dummy variable to 
demarcate the period before and after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley on July 30th, 2002. This act 
decreased the available window of time for reporting options and following its passage, the 
percentage of extremely lucky grant dates declined (Heron and Lie, 2007). Finally, for the imprinting 
analyses we controlled for the year of the option grant report. This allowed us to control for any time 
trends in option grants without imposing any functional form on the trend. 
Analytical Method 
We considered a suspiciously lucky grant date as an ethical transgression. Our backdating 
dependent variable was categorical and took the following form:  
, = 1	 !( = "#$%&	'"#() ≤ 0.0250	 !( = "#$%&	'"#() > 0.025	  
, equals 1 if a grant i at time t is has a price-date combination that is only likely to have happened 
randomly 2.5% of the time or less. The use of a categorical variable suggests employing a probability 
estimation model. For ease of interpretation we used linear probability models and reported 
coefficients that can be interpreted similar to an OLS model (a coefficient β expresses the change in 
probability associated with a one unit increase in X). However, since linear probability models are 
less efficient than linking functions based on the binomial distribution (Agresti, 2007), we ran all 
models with logistic model estimations. Similar results emerged using either approach.  
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Most of the executives in our sample received multiple grants during the period (Mean = 
53.60, SD = 6.88), implying that a significant number of observations in our panel were not 
independent. To address the non-independence of multiple within-executive observations, we 
clustered all error terms at the individual CEO level and added a control variable to capture the total 
number of grants received by an individual in our sample. Using linear probability models and 
clustering the error terms at the individual level makes our estimations highly conservative. Indeed, 
relaxing either of these constraints greatly increases the significance of our findings. 
Results 
Table 1 includes descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables.4  
-----------------------------------  
Insert Table 1 about here  
------------------------------------ 
 
Current economic conditions and backdating. Table 2 reports the results of the linear 
probability models predicting backdating from individual attributes, firm attributes, and economic 
conditions. Model 1 shows the main effect of the unemployment rate on backdating, controlling only 
for industry. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, higher unemployment rates were associated with a lower 
likelihood of backdating stock options. Model 2 adds controls for CEO age and finds similar effects. 
A one unit increase in the unemployment rate was associated with a 1.7% decrease in the likelihood 
of backdating. 
-----------------------------------  
Insert Table 2 about here  
------------------------------------ 
 
In Model 3, we added a control for firm size. Consistent with past research, firm size was 
negatively related to backdating (Bebchuk and Roe 1999; Bebchuk et al. 2010). As previously noted, 
larger firms tend to have more internal controls, reputable auditors, and additional public scrutiny, all 
of which reduce the likelihood that executives in these firms will backdate their options (Bizjak, 
                                                            
4
 Age and the unemployment rate at workforce entry are highly correlated given that economic conditions 
generally improved over the period examined. This correlation is significant and can create multicollinearity in 
our models. We address this concern by centering our age variable and testing the Variable Inflation Factor 
(VIF) for each model (Hair et al., 1995). In none of the models does our main predictor exceed a VIF value of 
1.61.   
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Lemmon and Whitby, 2009). Similar results emerged. Model 4 added a control for firm returns and 
found similar results.  
Model 5 added individual fixed effects. This allowed us to examine whether the effects were 
driven by other time-invariant individual differences that are not captured in our models. Similar 
effects emerged using this conservative test.  
Model 6 added a control for opportunity. As shown in Table 1, simple correlations revealed 
that CEOs who were at the helm of companies with more volatile stocks were more likely to backdate 
their stock options. This suggests that when there was greater opportunity and more to gain, CEOs 
were more likely to backdate their stock options. Even after controlling for volatility, the relationship 
between economic conditions and backdating remained marginally significant. This suggests that 
opportunity explains some but not all of the increase in corporate misconduct during prosperous 
times.  
Model 7 added a dummy variable for the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. Since Sarbanes-Oxley 
passed as the economy was slowing down, including this dummy variable considerably constricts the 
economic variation on which we can identify. Consequently, the relationship between economic 
conditions and backdating no longer reached significance. This is likely due to an over-specified 
model. Indeed, when we removed the control for volatility which is also linked to backdating and 
economic conditions, the relationship between economic conditions and backdating remained 
significant, even after including the control for Sarbanes-Oxley.  
 
 
-----------------------------------  
Insert Figure 3 about here  
------------------------------------ 
 
Figure 3 plots the trends in backdating and the unemployment rate over this time period using 
the predicted values from the model y = α + β2t + βt + β4t4 + ε where the dependent variable is 
either the unemployment rate or the proportion of backdating and time t is a linear time measure at the 
monthly level. 
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To examine the magnitude of these effects, we looked at the likelihood of backdating in the 
best and worst economic climates. During this time period, the unemployment rate ranged from 3.8% 
to 6.3%, or a difference of 2.5%.  For most of our models, the coefficient for unemployment was 
1.7%. As previously noted, roughly 12.5% of grants in our sample were suspiciously lucky.  This 
suggests that during the worst economic period in this sample, approximately 10.3% of stock option 
grants would have been backdated. Conversely, during the best economic period of this sample, 
approximately 14.6% of grants would have been backdated.  
-----------------------------------  
Insert Table 3 about here  
------------------------------------ 
 
Ethical imprinting. Table 3 shows the results of the linear probability models predicting 
backdating from workforce entry economic conditions. Model 1 shows the main effect of the 
unemployment rate at graduation controlling for year, industry, and the number of grants the CEO 
received over this time period. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, CEOs who began their career in worse 
economic times were significantly less likely to backdate their stock options. Model 2 added a control 
for CEO age and found a similar negative relationship between the unemployment rate at workforce 
entry and backdating. A one unit increase in the unemployment rate was associated with a 0.7% 
decrease in the likelihood of backdating.  
Model 3 added dummy variables for decade of birth rather than age to capture any 
generational differences in engaging in corporate misconduct. As shown in this model, there was not 
substantial evidence for generational differences in the likelihood of backdating. The only cohort that 
showed a significantly greater likelihood of backdating was the cohort born in the 1970s. However, 
only 4 CEOs in our sample were born in the 1970s and this pattern likely reflects the backdating 
behavior of a single CEO. Importantly, a similar relationship between workforce entry conditions and 
unethical behavior emerged using this alternative specification of age.  
Model 4 added a control for firm size, which was negatively related to the likelihood of stock 
options being backdated. Simple correlations suggest that CEOs who graduated in prosperous times 
were more likely to be at the helm of large companies, a result that is consistent with past research 
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(Schoar and Zuo, 2012). Yet, even though this would have made it harder to misrepresent the date a 
grant was actually awarded, these CEOs still showed an increased propensity to backdate. 
 Model 5 added a control for firm performance and found similar effects. Finally, Model 6 
included controls for the current unemployment rate and volatility. Similar results emerged using 
these controls. The current unemployment rate did not emerge as a significant predictor in these 
models. This is because we included year fixed effects in these analyses and there were rarely 
substantial fluctuations in the monthly unemployment rate within a single year. Indeed, if we remove 
year fixed effects, the current unemployment rate becomes a highly significant predictor of 
backdating in these models.  
Finally, Model 7 added a control for the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. Similar results emerged. 
Indeed, across all models, CEOs who entered the workforce in prosperous times were more likely to 
backdate their stock option grants than CEOs who entered in worse economic times.  
Again, we sought to assess the magnitude of these effects by examining the likelihood of 
backdating depending on the economic climate at the time a CEO entered the workforce. The 
difference in the unemployment rate for CEOs who graduated in the best (unemployment rate = 2.9%) 
rather than the worst (unemployment rate = 9.7%) economic environment over this time period was 
6.8%. This suggests that for CEOs who graduated in the best economic time during this period, 
roughly 14.8% of their stock options would have been backdated. For CEOs who graduated during the 
worst economic times, this number would have fallen to 10.1%. 
While our analyses provided support for both hypotheses, the effects were small.  One reason 
for the relatively small size of these effects is that we use fairly conservative tests of unethical 
behavior. Indeed, we only classify an option as suspicious if it comes on one of the luckiest few days 
of the reporting window. This approach is likely to underestimate the magnitude of these effects.  
Even so, our results suggest that small changes in corporate misconduct can have important 
repercussions for a firm and an individual. Executives caught backdating faced considerable fines and 
were likely to lose their jobs. Following backdating revelations, many companies had to restate 
earnings reports and pay hefty fines. Given the considerable individual and corporate implications of 
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being caught, even small changes in the likelihood of engaging in such behavior are likely to be 
economically, professionally, and organizationally meaningful.  
 
Interaction between Current and Workforce Entry Economic Conditions  
 
 Finally, we tested whether current economic conditions and workforce entry economic 
conditions interacted to affect the likelihood of engaging in unethical behavior. Recent work has 
found that organizational prosperity at the time an employee joins an organization interacts with 
concurrent organizational resources to influence individual behavior (Tilcsik, 2014). This raised the 
question of whether all CEOs were more likely to cheat during prosperous times or whether the 
increased propensity to cheat differed depending on workforce entry economic conditions. We tested 
this possibility by creating an interaction term between the current unemployment rate and the 
unemployment rate at workforce entry and added this term to all the models shown in Table 3. This 
interaction term was not significant in any of the models. This null result suggests that workforce 
entry economic conditions affect an executive’s baseline propensity to cheat. Current economic 
conditions appear to raise and lower this propensity across CEOs.   
 
Selection  
While our analyses showed substantial support for our hypothesis that entering the workforce 
in prosperous times predicts later unethical behavior, there are several plausible alternative 
explanations for our observed effects. One plausible alternative explanation concerns selection. In a 
typical recession, enrollment into undergraduate and graduate programs rises as many young adults 
try to avoid the labor market until economic conditions improve (Kahn, 2010). This introduces the 
possibility that there are uncaptured differences between those who pursue additional education in 
recessions or prosperous times. For instance, it is likely that new graduates who are able to find a job 
in a recession may be particularly capable given the difficulty of securing a job during these periods. 
Those who are not able to find work may pursue additional degrees, raising the possibility that 
recession cohorts are more highly skilled. Additionally, those who started their careers in recessions 
may have to be unusually talented or hard-working to rise to the ranks of the CEO. While it is unclear 
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what, if any, implications these possible differences might have for ethical behavior, these and other 
selection issues suggest that there may be unobserved differences between recession and boom 
graduates.  
We addressed this concern by estimating rather than measuring the year of workforce entry. 
We did this by conducting analyses in which our primary predictor was economic conditions at the 
typical age of graduation rather than the actual age at which executives earned their highest degrees. 
The majority of college graduates in the United States earn their undergraduate degrees at age 22. 
Since individuals do not choose their date of birth, the unemployment rate at age 22 should be 
unaffected by an executives’ choice to obtain additional education. Thus, economic conditions at age 
22 provided one test of whether selection is driving our results.  
 
-----------------------------------  
Insert Table 4 about here  
------------------------------------ 
 
Table 4 presents the results of models predicting backdating using this approach. Because 
economic conditions at age 22, age, and year are so highly related, we did not include year fixed 
effects in these models. As shown in Table 4, across all models, the unemployment rate at age 22 
negatively predicted backdating. These analyses suggest that the relationship between economic 
conditions at workforce entry and ethical behavior cannot be explained by a tendency of people of 
varying ethical proclivities to differentially time their entry into the job market. Even so, we were not 
able to rule out the possibility that other selection mechanisms may be driving some of the observed 
effects.  
General Discussion 
 Using a large sample of American executives and an unobtrusive indicator of unethical 
behavior, we found that CEOs were more likely to engage in corporate misconduct during prosperous 
economic times. Moreover, we found that CEOs who began their careers in prosperous times were 
more likely to engage in unethical behavior later in their careers. Executives who entered the 
workforce in an economic boom were significantly more likely to backdate their stock options to 
maximize their financial gains. These results could not be explained by the size of the companies they 
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led or the industries they occupied. Rather the conditions of their early careers predicted their 
propensity to misrepresent critical components of their compensation packages at a later point in life.  
Our findings make several theoretical contributions to research on corporate misconduct and 
career imprints. Perhaps most importantly, they suggest that strong environmental conditions can 
affect the likelihood of traversing ethical boundaries both in the short term and, if experienced during 
an impressionable period, long after economic conditions have changed. Past research on precursors 
of corporate misconduct has focused largely on how proximal contextual signals heighten or dampen 
the likelihood that corporate leaders will cheat. For instance, CEOs are more likely to misrepresent 
company earnings if their financial incentives are linked to company performance (Bergstresser and 
Philippon 2006; Zhang et al., 2008). The present findings suggest that the broader economic 
environment, apart from an executive’s pay package and outside the organization itself, can influence 
the likelihood that a CEO will cheat. In doing so, it suggests that strong, diffuse situations and 
experiences can shape ethical behavior in the present and well into the future.  
These findings also contribute to our growing understanding of the mark that early career 
conditions can leave on later attitudes and behaviors. Past work has shown that CEO’s who begin 
their careers in prosperous times tend to run larger companies, are more likely to move across 
companies and industries, and employ more aggressive financial strategies  (Schoar and Zuo, 2012). 
The present results suggest that early career economic conditions also predict the likelihood of ethical 
missteps later in life. Given the substantial organizational and personal costs of executive misconduct, 
these findings are both practically and theoretically important (Peng and Roell, 2008; Pfarrer et al, 
2008; Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, and Hambrick, 2008).   
These findings also contribute to our understanding of how ethical norms and ethos develop. 
Past work on the formation of ethical systems has suggested that childhood families are the primary 
vehicle through which moral attitudes are transmitted (e.g. Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969; Noe and 
Rebello, 1994). Other work has highlighted the role of educational institutions in shaping moral 
values (e.g., Akerloff, 1983). The current findings suggest that strong experiences outside of 
childhood and apart from formal education also influence the moral proclivities of corporate leaders. 
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In doing so, it builds on a growing body of work suggesting that strong experiences in early adulthood 
can shape ethical behavior in later life (e.g. Benmelech and Frydman, 2015). 
Our work also highlights the relative malleability of ethical behavior to concurrent economic 
conditions. Indeed, when the economy was doing well, all CEOs in our sample were more likely to 
engage in backdating, even those who first began their careers in a recession. This suggests that early 
experiences appear to influence one’s baseline propensity to cheat but concurrent economic 
conditions can move this starting point up or down.  
Limitations and future directions  
While our work uses a large sample of American executives and unobtrusively charts 
behavior over ten years, it does have several limitations which also point to fruitful areas for future 
research. First, the examined period consisted of only modest fluctuations in economic conditions 
which allowed a somewhat constrained test of Hypothesis 1. On the one hand, significant results in 
this context suggest that even small economic changes can have meaningful implications for ethical 
behavior. On the other hand, economic conditions never became particularly dire during this time 
period. Thus it is unclear whether a deeper downturn would continue to yield ethical improvements.  
Second, while we suggest that beginning one’s career in prosperous times affects the mental 
models new entrants form about ethically acceptable practices and norms, there are other potential 
explanations for these results. For instance, because our inquiry is limited to the business world, it is 
possible that unexamined selection variables account for our results.  
Finally, future work could elucidate exactly how workforce entry economic conditions 
imprint the ethical leanings of young workers. Our reasoning points to two potential mechanisms. 
First, it suggests that workforce entrants are more likely to be exposed to ethically-questionable 
behavior during booms and thus are more likely to view such questionable practices as acceptable and 
normative. Second, it suggests that beginning one’s career amidst a wealth of opportunities may 
evoke a mentality of overconfidence and risk-taking that is more conducive to cheating. Future 
research could tease apart these mechanisms. One way to do this would be to follow a CEO’s career 
progression over time. Scholars could then examine whether boom time graduates who begin their 
careers in ethically-suspect organizations carry stronger imprints than those who begin in more 
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ethically responsible firms. Supportive evidence would suggest that direct exposure to unethical 
practices rather than a general mentality of deservingness are driving these effects. Such inquires 
could continue to clarify when and how those who enter the workforce in prosperous times are more 
likely to behave unethically later on.  
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Figure 3. Polynomial Trend of the Proportion of Suspiciously Lucky Stock Option Grants and the 
National Unemployment Rate by Month, 1996-2005.  
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Table 1. Correlations and Summary Statistics  
 
All correlations |.03| p < .01  
 
 
  
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Backdate 0.15 0.35 
     
 
  
2. Current Unemployment     
    Rate 4.99 0.69 -0.032     
 
  
3. Unemployment Rate  
    at Workforce Entry 5.53 1.55 -0.002  0.074     
  
4. CEO Age  52.96 7.61 -0.017  0.041 -0.517   
 
  
5. Firm size (Annual  
    revenues log) 6.23 2.21 -0.057 -0.033 -0.110 0.185  
 
  
6. ROA (log) -0.02 0.34 -0.011 -0.051  -0.083  0.105 0.332 
 
  
7. Number of grants     
    per individual 15.32 20.97 -0.053 -0.072 -0.153 0.079 0.333 0.102   
8. Volatility  1.28 1.95 0.072 -0.214 -0.020  -0.014 0.166 0.061 0.089  
9. Sarbanes-Oxley 0.33 0.47 -0.026   0.643  0.135 0.052 -0.031 -0.037 -0.117 -0.165 
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Table 2. Linear Probability Model of the Likelihood of Backdating by Monthly Unemployment 
Rate.  
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Current Unemployment 
Rate  
   -0.016** 
  (0.006) 
   -0.017** 
 (0.006) 
   -0.018** 
  (0.006) 
 -0.017** 
(0.006) 
  -0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.009† 
 (0.005) 
-0.006 
 (0.007) 
CEO age 
 -0.000 
 (0.001) 
    0.000 
 (0.001) 
    0.000 
(0.001) 
  -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
 
Firm size (log) 
 
    -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
  -0.013*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.013*** 
 (0.002) 
ROA (lagged)        0.014 
 (0.012) 
    0.007 
 (0.016) 
 0.013 
 (0.012) 
 0.013 
 (0.012) 
Volatility     
         
 
         
   0.014*** 
 (0.003) 
        
   0.014*** 
 (0.003) 
SOX  
      
-0.009 
 (0.011) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects     Yes   
Constant 
  0.223** 
(0.028)   
 
  0.118** 
(0.040) 
   0.161*** 
(0.041) 
   0.165*** 
(0.041) 
   0.165*** 
(0.041) 
   0.123*** 
(0.042) 
   0.110*** 
(0.046) 
Observations 8,847 8,847 8,847 8,847 8,847 8,847 8,847 
Number of Individuals 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 
R2  0.014 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.022 0.022 
***
 p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are in parentheses 
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Table 3. Linear Probability Model of Backdating by Workforce Entry Economic Conditions  
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Workforce entry 
unemployment rate 
-0.005† 
(0.003) 
-0.007* 
  (0.003) 
 -0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.003) 
-0.007* 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
CEO age    -0.001 (0.001) 
    
 
  -0.001 
(0.001) 
   -0.001 
(0.001) 
  -0.000 
  (0.001) 
   -0.000 
   (0.001) 
Birth decade: 1930s  
(N = 258)   
 -0.001 
  (0.042)     
Birth decade 1940s 
(N = 863)   
 0.000 
 (0.042)     
Birth decade 1950s  
(N = 675)   
    0.011 
   (0.042)     
Birth decade 1960s  
(N = 191)   
    0.034 
   (0.045)     
Birth decade 1970s  
(N = 4)   
    0.209* 
   (0.101)     
Firm size (log) 
 
   
 -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.010*** 
 (0.002) 
  -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
ROA (lagged) 
 
  
0.013 
(0.012) 
   0.013 
(0.012) 
  0.011 
 (0.012) 
   0.011 
  (0.012) 
Current 
unemployment rate     
  -0.012 
(0.015) 
 -0.006 
 (0.015) 
  -0.005 
  (0.015) 
Volatility        0.014
***
 
 (0.003) 
   0.014*** 
  (0.003) 
Sarbanes Oxley         -0.009 
  (0.021) 
Number of grants 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant    0.094
***
 
(0.027) 
   0.151** 
  (0.048) 
   0.114* 
  (0.051) 
  0.175*** 
 (0.048) 
 0.238* 
(0.094) 
 0.204* 
(0.094) 
 0.204* 
(0.094) 
Observations 8,847 8,847 8,847 8,847 8,847 8,843 8,841 
Number of Clusters 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
***
 p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are in parentheses 
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Table 4. Linear Probability Models of Backdating Using the Unemployment at Age 22 to 
Instrument Workforce Entry Economic Conditions   
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Unemployment rate at 
age 22  
   -0.005† 
(0.003) 
-0.008* 
(0.003) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.006† 
(0.003) 
   -0.006† 
 (0.003) 
CEO age     -0.001
†
 
 (0.001) 
    
 
  -0.001 
(0.001) 
   -0.001 
(0.001) 
  -0.000 
  (0.001) 
   -0.000 
   (0.001) 
Birth decade: 1930s  
(N = 258)   
  0.005 
  (0.043)     
Birth decade 1940s 
(N = 863)   
 0.000 
 (0.042)     
Birth decade 1950s  
(N = 675)   
    0.007 
   (0.043)     
Birth decade 1960s  
(N = 191)   
    0.029 
   (0.047)     
Birth decade 1970s  
(N = 4)   
         
    0.207*    
   (0.102) 
    
Firm size (log) 
 
   
 -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.010*** 
 (0.002) 
  -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
ROA (lagged) 
 
   
   0.016 
(0.012) 
  0.014 
 (0.012) 
   0.013 
  (0.012) 
Current 
unemployment rate     
  -0.018** 
(0.006) 
 -0.010† 
 (0.006) 
  -0.005 
  (0.007) 
Volatility       0.014
***
 
 (0.003) 
  0.014*** 
 (0.003) 
   0.014*** 
  (0.003) 
Sarbanes Oxley         -0.010 
  (0.011) 
Number of grants 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant    0.033
***
 
(0.016) 
  0.106* 
  (0.043) 
  0.045 
  (0.045) 
  0.136** 
(0.043) 
  0.219*** 
(0.051) 
  0.176*** 
(0.052) 
   0.189* 
  (0.092) 
Observations 8,847 8,847 8,847 8,847 8,843 8,841 8,841 
Number of Clusters 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,012 
R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.024 0.024 
 
***
 p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are in parentheses 
